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Interface Theory vs Gibson: An Ontological Defense of the 
Ecological Approach
Andrew D Wilson
Leeds School of Social Sciences, Leeds Beckett University, Leeds, UK
ABSTRACT
Interface theory is the hypothesis that inferential, representa-
tional theories of perception entail that fitness, not truth, 
dictates the evolution of perceptual systems. They show, 
with simulations, that “veridical” perceptual mappings (ones 
that preserve at least some of the structure of the world) are 
routinely out-competed by “non-veridical” interfaces (ones 
that make no attempt to preserve that structure). They there-
fore take particular aim at the direct perception, ecological 
approach to perception and work to show that such 
a system, even if technically an option, would never be 
selected for by evolution. This paper defends the ecological 
approach from this novel, existential attack by showing that 
the ecological hypothesis is so different in kind to the infer-
ential, representational view of perception that it simply falls 
outside the scope of interface theory’s critiques; ecological 
psychology remains a viable scientific endeavor. This analysis 
will show that, far from being a radical new approach to 
perception, interface theory is simply a clear and elegant 
formalization of mainstream representational psychology, 
and any implications interface theory may have belong solely 
to that branch of science.
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Hoffman et al. (2015; hence HS&P) propose a supposedly radical take on the 
nature of perceptual experience in the form of their interface theory (see also 
Hoffman, 2008, 2009, 2011; Hoffman & Singh, 2012; Mark et al., 2010). They 
begin with the Establishment1 assumption that perception is an inferential, 
representational, mental process. This assumption is a consequence of the 
hypothesis that the objects of perception are observer-independent proper-
ties (the kind of properties measured by physics, e.g., mass, spatial extent). 
To support behavior, these properties must be transformed into behavio-
rally relevant, observer-dependent properties (e.g., is that a mass I can lift? Is 
that a gap I can cross?). For HS&P and other representational researchers, 
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this transformation is implemented by a computational mental representa-
tion which infers the behaviorally relevant property from the presence of the 
observer-independent properties. HS&P formalize this to say that these 
mental representations implement a mapping function to convert the phy-
sical world into a behaviorally relevant perceptual experience. They then call 
these functions interfaces, and note that these mapping functions can, in 
principle, vary in the degree to which they preserve the structure of the 
physical world. In a series of evolutionary simulations, HS&P claim to 
compete all possible types of mapping functions against one another, and 
formally demonstrate the surprising result that veridical interfaces (map-
pings that preserve at least some of the structure of the environment) are 
routinely out-competed into extinction by non-veridical interfaces (map-
pings built in whatever form required to get to the behaviorally-relevant 
experience and, more specifically, to optimize fitness). Perception, they 
argue, must therefore be a non-veridical but adaptive interface that hides 
the messy details of the “true” world and instead presents us with a series of 
behaviorally useful fictions, fictions they say include things like “objects” 
and “events”.
One theory of perception that seems to immediately lose in this scenario 
is James J Gibson’s direct perception, ecological approach (Gibson, 1966, 
1979; Michaels & Carello, 1981; Turvey et al., 1981). Gibson rejected the 
need for internal mental representations performing information proces-
sing. Instead, he proposed a theory of ecological information which explains 
how behaviorally relevant, observer-dependent properties can be the pri-
mary objects of perception. If perception does not require inference to 
connect us to the behaviorally relevant world, then perception should be 
veridical, at least to some extent. If, however, HS&P are right and evolution 
will always favor non-veridical perceptual systems over any kind of veridical 
ones, then evolution will never produce a Gibsonian organism, and the 
ecological approach is therefore dead on arrival. HS&P of course argue 
precisely this.
This is a novel challenge to the ecological approach; most critiques focus 
on the limits of what information can specify and therefore what behaviors 
it can or cannot support (e.g., catching a fly ball vs imagining catching a fly 
ball; see Clark & Toribio, 1994). Interface theory instead claims that evolu-
tion will never produce an ecological perceptual system of any kind; that 
only a representational system can support perception. This paper defends 
Gibson and the ecological approach from the formalized objections HS&P 
raise, in order to demonstrate that direct perception remains a viable com-
petitor to the representational approach.
The paper will work as follows. I will briefly review interface theory. I will 
then detail the new interface theory objection, that Gibson’s ecological 
approach is a form of veridical perceptual mapping strategy that falls victim 
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to the various results from the evolutionary simulations. My primary line of 
defense is philosophical,2 and it is the claim that the ecological and infer-
ential approaches to perception are so ontologically different in kind that the 
challenge posed by HS&P comes nowhere near Gibson. I will detail the two 
ontologies and their implications, then detail how the modern ecological 
approach has formalized its ontology into a science of affordances and 
perceptual information. This analysis will show three things. First, interface 
theory is not so radical; it is actually a fairly standard inferential, representa-
tional theory of perception. More importantly, the various radical results 
actually emerge from the long-standing and unsolved problem of represen-
tational grounding (e.g., Harnad, 1990; Searle, 1980), which interface theory 
embraces, rather than solves. Second, it will make it clear that the radically 
different understanding of perception is actually the ecological approach, 
and that this difference runs deep enough that the results of interface theory 
have no implications for Gibson’s theory. Third, it will show that only the 
ecological ontology can resolve the grounding problem, which really needs 
solving (Golonka & Wilson, 2019a).
Interface Theory
What is the relationship between the structure of the world and the struc-
ture of our perceptual experience of that world? Is our experience veridical, 
or an adaptive fiction? To answer this, HS&P claim to identify and formally 
describe the full range of possible perceptual mapping strategies in terms of 
set theory (pg.1482), and then place the strategies in simulated evolutionary 
competition with one another to see which prevails.
Their analysis proceeds as follows. There is perceptual experience, 
described as a set of states X, some of which are behaviorally relevant events. 
There is also a world, described as a set of states W, some of which are 
behaviorally relevant events. Different perceptual mapping strategies are 
then expressed as different functions P that relate world states W to percep-
tual states X (P:W→X). HS&P then describe a continuum of functions 
P that vary in how veridically they map W→X by relaxing the degree to 
which P preserves W structure into X. These strategies3 range from omnis-
cient realism (where perceptual experience and the world are identical sets 
and therefore world structure is veridically preserved in perceptual experi-
ence) through naïve realism (where perceptual experience is a subset of 
world states and that subset veridically preserves the structure of the world) 
to critical realism (where perceptual experience is not a subset of world 
states but does veridically preserve at least some of the structure of the world 
set anyway). The final strategy is the interface, in which perceptual experi-
ence is not a subset of world states and there is no requirement for percep-
tion to veridically preserve any of the structure in the world set.
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HS&P then ran evolutionary simulations (pg.1485) in which agents 
implementing the various strategies compete with each other for resources 
in a simple world. The agents’ ability to reproduce is evaluated using 
a fitness function, and the winner identified using a replicator equation. 
HS&P describe one example of a world set that includes one resource, the 
amount of which can range from 0 to 100, and agents with perceptual 
experience sets that consists of four possible states. The resource has 
a Gaussian pay-off function for the agents; too little or too much is bad, 
with amounts centered on 50 the best. The question is, which way of 
mapping world states into perceptual states produces the most adaptive 
behavior (best tracks the pay-off function)?
All realist strategies must organize their perceptual states so as to replicate 
at least a subset of the structure in the world. In this example, the world 
structure is resource amount. One state could be used to represent 0–25 of 
the resource, another 25–50, then 50–75 and finally 75–100. The problem 
here is that this is not an effective way of representing the Gaussian pay-off 
function. Categorizing amounts from 50 to 75 as “the same” in perceptual 
experience means lumping in many non-optimal amounts with optimal 
ones, and the resulting behavior will not be optimally adaptive.
Interface strategies are not limited this way, and so perceptual experience 
is allowed to be organized in a way that has nothing to do with world 
structure like resource quantity if that’s not useful. An interface strategy can 
use states to categorize not by resource amount, but by payoff amount (e.g., 
use one state to represent “low payoff,” which happens close to both 0 and 
100 amount of resource).
Whenever payoff is a non-monotonic function of resource quantity 
(which HS&P claim is typical) then realist strategies are unable to represent 
the payoff function effectively and thus produce less adaptive behavior. 
Interfaces can represent the payoff function, however, and therefore 
HS&P find that “. . . strict interface strategies that are tuned to fitness 
routinely drive naïve realist and critical realist strategies to extinction” 
(page 1486). In order to support adaptive behavior, they argue that real 
perception should therefore implement an interface perceptual mapping 
strategy.
This has a big implication. If perception is an interface, then the elements 
of our perceptual experience (objects, events, etc.) might simply be fictions 
that do not exist in the world. Instead, they would be cognitive inventions 
that efficiently encode the payoff function that describes how to adaptively 
interact with the world. HS&P make the analogy to icons in a windows- 
based computer interface (pg.1488). There is no literal “file on a desktop” in 
my computer, but this representation of the internal structure of my com-
puter’s memory is an effective way for me to interact quickly and accurately 
with that actual internal structure. In the same way, HS&P suggest that there 
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may be nothing sensibly described as “objects” out in the world, and that 
these are merely icons in our perceptual experience that allow us to interact 
adaptively with the world:
Formally, the interface theory of perception proposes that the perceptual strategies of 
H. sapiens and, indeed, of all organisms are, generically, strict interface strategies. 
Recall that this means, in the dispersion-free case, that the perceptual function, P: 
W→X, that maps states of the external world W onto perceptual experiences X, is not 
veridical in the following two senses. First, X is not a subset of W, so that none of our 
perceptual experiences are literally true of the world. Second, P is not 
a homomorphism of any structures intrinsic to W, other than the event structure 
required for probability, so that no structural relationships among our perceptions are 
literally true of the world. 
pg. 1489
HS&P specifically call out Gibson’s theory of direct perception as an exam-
ple of a naïve realist strategy, and propose that as a result evolution would 
not have favored any organism trying to implement this strategy. If naïve 
realist perceptual mappings are not evolutionarily stable, then direct per-
ception cannot possibly be a thing. Interface theory therefore makes a very 
strong existential claim specifically about direct perception, and so it is 
important to demonstrate that there is a strong defense. The rest of this 
paper articulates that defense.
The Objections to the Ecological Approach
Interface theory raises one novel objection4 to the ecological approach that 
needs to be addressed:
First, Gibson got evolution wrong: He claimed that evolution shapes veridical percep-
tions of those aspects of the world that have adaptive significance for us. Thus Gibson 
proposed naïve realism, not the interface theory . . . . 
pg.1500
The objection actually comes in two parts; the evolutionary supremacy of 
non-veridical interfaces and the Invention of Symmetry theorem. I will 
tackle these separately, by first sketching out the defensive moves, and 
then defending these more fully in the following section.
Objection 1: The Evolutionary Supremacy of Non-Veridical Strategies
HS&P class the ecological approach as a “naïve realist” interface strategy, in 
which at least some of the structure of the world is preserved in perceptual 
experience. (The ecological solution is indeed this kind of realism, although 
as we shall see it is not an interface strategy.) HS&P then pit a full range of 
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interface strategies, including naïve realism, against one another in evolu-
tionary simulations, and find that
strict interface strategies that are tuned to fitness routinely drive naïve realist and 
critical realist strategies to extinction . . . .The only situation in which realists have 
a chance against interface strategies is when payoff varies monotonically with resource 
quantity, i.e., when truths and payoffs are roughly the same thing. 
pg.1486
This happens because of the nature of the simulations; the payoff function 
literally rewards fitness and not veridicality, so when the two are not the 
same veridicality cannot win. HS&P defend this feature of the simulations 
by saying
. . . we cannot expect, in general, that payoff functions vary monotonically with truth, 
because (1) monotonic functions are a (unbiased) measure zero subset of the possible 
payoff functions, and (2) even if they weren’t, the ubiquitous biological need for 
homeostasis militates against them. Thus, we cannot expect, in general, that natural 
selection has tuned our perceptions to truth, i.e., we cannot expect our perceptions to 
be veridical. 
pg.1486-7
Their homeostasis example is about “amount of water.” The payoff for water 
is not a monotonic linear function of amount of water; a little and a lot are 
both bad for you.
So fitness and veridicality are rarely the same thing and because evolution 
favors fitness, it will always out-compete veridicality. Gibson’s approach 
entails veridical perception and therefore he is out of the game.
Defense 1: Perception of the Ecologically Scaled World Tracks Payoff Directly
Recall that veridical mappings can survive the simulations “when payoff 
varies monotonically with resource quantity, i.e., when truths and payoffs 
are roughly the same thing” (pg. 1486). Payoff is the function that describes 
the world in behaviorally relevant terms – the consequences (for good or ill) 
of an amount of water, and not simply the amount of water. HS&P claim 
that the resource quantity and payoff functions are never the same because 
the world (as described by physics in terms of observer-independent proper-
ties; “truth”) is never the same as the world described in terms of behavioral 
consequences (“payoff”).
Gibson, however, was not trying to understand perception of the world as 
described by the science of physics. Physics takes an abstract, observer- 
independent position in order to understand the laws that operate at all 
spatial and temporal scales across the universe. It is, however, the wrong 
ontology to identify the objects of perception for an embodied observer 
living at a specific spatial and temporal scale. Gibson (1979) lays out an 
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ecological-level physical analysis of the world-to-be-experienced by such an 
observer; in fact, he recognized that this was so important it is the first four 
chapters of this book on vision, prior to any discussion about eyes! The 
resulting ontology carves up the world so that behaviorally relevant proper-
ties (which Gibson terms affordances) are primary, and it hypothesizes that 
these properties are the objects of perception. To the extent, these objects 
create information about themselves, Gibson’s analysis predicts that they 
can be perceived directly, no inference required (Turvey et al., 1981).
In effect, Gibson’s ecological approach is a hypothesis that the ecological 
“truth” of the physical world is already in the form of the “payoff” function 
and that this can be perceived (this relates to the concept of the umwelt; Von 
Uexküll, 1957). I will review the details below (see “The Nature of the 
Ecologically Scaled World”); for now I just want to note that given the 
right ontology (world structure) to preserve, naïve realist perceptual systems 
like the ecological approach remain viable competitors in the evolutionary 
simulations. I would also note here, though, that the fact an interface theory 
analysis of affordances would find them to be both physical world structure 
and the interface contents is a hint that such an analysis is not the way to go.
However, even if we did evolve such an interface, HS&P have another 
immediate objection to it ever being sufficiently adaptive; the Invention of 
Symmetry theorem.
Objection 2: The Invention of Symmetry Theorem
Interface theory is formalized in terms of set theory. An interface is 
a mapping function from one set of things (the world as described by 
physics) to another (perceptual experience). HS&P have an argument, 
however, that shows that perceptual experience set structure actually tells 
you nothing about the world set structure. There is no necessary link, no 
symmetry, between them. This implies that the rich structure and sensible 
behavior of our perceptual experience (including things like objects and 
events) is actually not evidence that these things exist in the world set; they 
could still just be fictional icons in the interface. The argument is called the 
Invention of Symmetry Theorem, and its corollary, the Invention of Space- 
Time Theorem.
After a formal set theoretic definition (pg. 1498) they summarize it 
this way:
The . . . theorem shows that the world itself may not share any of the symmetries that 
the observer observes. The world need not have the structure the observer perceives, 
no matter how complex that structure is and no matter how predictably and system-
atically that structure transforms as the observer acts. 
pg.1498
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HS&P do not note this explicitly, but this is potentially quite a strong attack 
on the foundations of the ecological approach. As we shall see below (“The 
Nature of Ecological Information”) one key ecological hypothesis is that 
information can specify properties of the world, and specification rests on 
a symmetry principle. Information can be used to perceive the world 
because its structure is lawfully related to structure in the world, and 
detecting the former is therefore informative about the latter (Shaw and 
McIntyre & Mace, 1974; Turvey et al., 1981). If symmetries are actually all 
cognitive inventions and cannot support an observer “tracking back” from 
their perceptual experience to the world, then specification is not possible 
and ecological information cannot support perception or action.
Defense 2: Ecological Perception Discovers, Not Invents Symmetry
The important thing to remember about interface theory is that it is not 
a theory of physics; HS&P have not discovered anything new about the 
nature of the universe. It is a theory of perception, specifically an inferential, 
constructivist, representational theory of perception, so their claims are 
about how we perceive that universe. The Invention of Symmetry theorem 
therefore cannot possibly be claiming “it is physically impossible to track 
from any symmetrical mapping of the world back to the world,” it can only 
be claiming “it is psychologically impossible to track back from some 
symmetrical mappings (specifically, inferential interfaces) to the world.“ 
In other words, not all symmetries are invented; some exist due to the 
laws of physics, rather than being the creation of a perceptual interface.
Luckily for the ecological approach, ecological information is not a mental 
representation and therefore not an interface in which the relevant symmetry 
was invented. Ecological information is created by the operation of ecologi-
cal-scale laws of physics, and it is in the world, waiting to be discovered and 
used by a perceptual system. Information is not constructed by us, its form is 
not optional, and the symmetry it has that perception depends on has not 
been created by a process of inference. As such, it is not within the (merely 
psychological) scope of the Invention of Symmetry Theorem.
In short, the Invention of Symmetry theorem applies only to the subset of 
possible symmetries that are invented via inference. The symmetry under-
pinning specification for ecological information is not in this subset. It is not 
a psychological invention, it is the result of an ecological level lawful 
physical process, and thus is safe from this problem.
Interfaces and Information Are Different In Kind – The Argument from 
Ontology
The previous section explicitly defended the ecological approach from the 
critiques HS&P level at the ecological approach, most importantly their 
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strong claim that evolution would never favor a Gibsonian perceptual 
system. The thread that underpins the two defensive moves I made is the 
claim that the ecological approach has an entirely different ontology to 
representational, inferential approaches such as interface theory. It is now 
time to back that claim up with details.
This section will therefore first review the Establishment, extensional 
ontology of inferential theories of perception-like interface theory, and 
highlight the key unsolved problems that this ontology creates (representa-
tion grounding, representation selection). I will then review the ecological, 
intensional ontology that proposes a way to solve these problems by refram-
ing the question of the nature of perception (Turvey et al., 1981; see also 
Chemero, 2009; Shaw & McIntyre 1974; Mace, 1977; Shaw et al., 1982; 
M. Turvey, 1977; Turvey, 2019; Turvey & Shaw, 1979). The goal of this 
section is to characterize the ontologies, identify that interface theory is only 
entailed by the Establishment ontology, and that the ecological ontology 
solves the problems without ever leading to interfaces or any of their 
consequences.
The Problems with Extensional Analyses of Perception
The Establishment ontology begins by characterizing the physical world-to- 
be-perceived in terms of observer-independent properties from physics 
(Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981). The world as described by physics does not 
contain much (if any) of the content of perceptual experience, and so that 
content must be constructed via inference. In order to support adaptive 
behavior, that inference requires “concepts that stand for environmental 
properties and concepts that stand for how those properties structure energy 
distributions in media” (Turvey et al., pg.246). These concepts must, for 
a variety of reasons, be implemented as computational representational 
systems (Golonka & Wilson, 2019; Fodor, 1980; Newell, 1980; Pylyshyn, 
1989).
Under this analysis, animals are therefore lawfully connected to the 
physical world, but are only connected to the behaviorally relevant proper-
ties of the world by inference – no law based connection. Another way to 
frame this is that behaviorally relevant properties (intensions) of things can 
only be perceived via inference based on the things implementing that 
property (extensions); it is an extensional analysis of perception (Turvey 
et al., 1981). More on this below.
This extensional ontology has two deep problems, however.
Representational Grounding
The first problem is that if you are only lawfully connected to extensions, 
there is no suitably constrained route to infer the correct intensions; you 
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cannot build the adaptive conceptual systems you require if perception is 
not up to the task of linking you to behaviorally relevant properties to begin 
with. So where do these conceptual systems get their content, and how do 
they have the content that they have, if not via perception? This is the 
essence of the symbol grounding problem (Bickhard, 2009; Harnad, 1990; 
Searle, 1980) which remains a major unsolved problem at the core of 
Establishment cognitive science.
In order to be able to effectively evaluate whether a proposed representa-
tion has been successfully grounded, Bickhard (2009) frames the question as 
the need for representational content to be internally related5 to the thing it 
represents;
“ . . . an internal relation is internal in a sense of being necessary in order for one or 
more of the relata to be what it is. . . . if content is internally related to representation, 
then whatever constitutes such a representation cannot be what it is without bearing 
that content” 
(pgs. 562-563).
When we apply this framing to interface theory, it is clear that interfaces and 
their contents are not related to each other in the necessary way to be 
grounded. Quite the contrary, interfaces are conceptual systems that expli-
citly have no obligation at all to be internally related to the world they 
represent. There is no lawful, necessary link between the form of icons in an 
interface and the thing they represent.
HS&P recognize that this problem is serious and propose a “Perception- 
Decision-Action” loop as a grounding mechanism (refer to Figure 1). W is 
the world set; G is the set of possible actions; X is the perceptual representa-
tion of W. An observer selects an action from G based on X (they make 
a decision, D), and this action, A, has an effect on W. That change in W is 
then perceived by X via perceptual channel P.
Interface theory imposes a constraint that has to be addressed. Our 
observer cannot know W (because of the Invention of Symmetry 
Problem), which means it can have no knowledge of either A or P. All it 
can know is that it made a decision D and that eventually led to a change in 
X that either improves or reduces the fitness of future decisions; it is the 
overall PDA loop that creates information in X about fitness, which is what 
X is trying to represent. HS&P then propose that organisms can simply 
tweak D (over either evolutionary or individual lifespan timescales) and 
hunt for optimal fitness in the resulting change in X. They propose that this 
system is grounded via the looping interaction with the world.
This idea is close in spirit to Bickhard’s (2009) interactivist model, his 
preferred solution to the need for internal relations to ground representa-
tions, so it is a solid swing at a solution. But fitness remains a problematic 
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relation; for example, in the PDA loop, fitness is evaluated entirely within 
the representation X, but with reference to what? There seems to be a need 
for an “interpreter” that is external to the representation X, and Bickhard 
notes this immediately becomes an “infinite regress of interpreters inter-
preting” (p 573) if the interpreter is not themselves grounded. The problem 
stems from the fact that there is no necessary connection between the form 
of an interface and the form of the world to be represented, and grounding 
requires a law-based link from world to perception (Harnad, 1990). 
Interface theory (like all inferential theories6) therefore still owes us an 
account of where representational content comes from.
Which Representation?
Even if you could build an inferential system that had the appropriate 
concepts, Turvey et al. (1981) show that if perception begins with exten-
sions, there is no way to constrain which representation is deployed at any 
given moment in time in order to get to the behaviorally relevant, inten-
sional property. As an example, they discuss the marsh periwinkle, and 
a problem that it faces.
In the periwinkle’s environment, there are things (plant stems) that have 
the property “can be climbed on.” The plant stems are extensions (specific 
implementations) of the intensional property “can be climbed on.” There 
are also things (plant stems, other snails) that have the property “are an 
obstacle to locomotion.” The plant stems and the snails are extensions of 
Figure 1. The Perception-Decision-Action loop (adapted from Hoffman et al., 2015).
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this property. Organisms need access to the intensional properties, and not 
just the extension, in order to produce adaptive behavior, and the 
Establishment ontology asserts that organisms are only connected to inten-
sions via inferences on their extensions. But in the example above, the 
extensions of the two properties overlap. If you detect a plant stem, you 
don’t know which property you’re dealing with. Is it currently a climbing 
opportunity, or an obstacle? There is no way to reliably guide inference to 
the correct (or most adaptive) belief about properties of plant stems. 
Interface theory is very explicitly committed to this analysis; interfaces are 
literally mappings from perceptual experience to intensional properties via 
inference on extensions of those properties. HS&P offer no solution to this 
problem.
Because these problems are so serious and intractable, Turvey et al. (1981) 
conclude that perception, if it is going to work, must be directly of inten-
sional properties, and so our theories must therefore begin with an inten-
sional analysis of what there is to be perceived. The ecological approach 
(Gibson, 1979) is such an analysis, making it different in kind to interface 
theory. The following two sections detail this different ontologies, in order 
to make it clear that the results of the extensional interface theory can have 
no bearing on the viability of the intensional ecological approach.
The Nature of the Ecologically Scaled World
HS&P note that “The only situation in which realists have a chance against 
interface strategies is when payoff varies monotonically with resource 
quantity, i.e., when truths and payoffs are roughly the same thing.” 
(pg.1486). My first defensive move was to state that veridical perception 
of the ecologically scaled physical world is such a case. This section 
justifies this move.
Interface theory assumes that the appropriate way to describe the world- 
to-be-perceived is through the lens of the science of physics. The problem 
here is that physics describes an abstract, observer independent world, 
shaped by laws with near-universal scope, from the very small to the very 
large, to the very slow to the very fast. The laws apply across a wide range of 
conditions, making physics the powerful science that it is today. Biological 
organisms, however, only operate within a fairly narrow range of condi-
tions. We are medium sized objects moving at fairly slow speeds at fairly 
sedate temperatures, and our biology is intimately connected to the more 
limited set of laws whose scope is only the spatial and temporal scales we 
operate at. This is okay; however, laws do not require universal scope to be 
laws, and in fact for this reason the scope is part of the specification of any 
law. In order to understand the physical context in which perceptual 
systems evolve, our theories of perception therefore need to begin with an 
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ecologically scaled physical description of the world-to-be-perceived and 
the laws that dominate physical processes at that scale.
At the ecological scale, the environment to be perceived is best described 
at the level of Newtonian mechanics using the formalisms of dynamical 
systems theory (DST; Bingham, 1995; Warren, 2006; Wilson & Bingham, 
2001). Specifically, a complete formal description of the world-to-be- 
perceived requires reference to the medium-sized states of the world, how 
they change over medium timescales, and the not-especially-extreme forces 
that caused those changes. This complete description allows units of time, 
position and its temporal derivatives, and mass.
DST is the right language, but it is not intrinsically a theory of the 
ecological scale, nor is it a theory of behavior. There is nothing in DST 
that can guide you to the behaviorally relevant properties of the environ-
ment (the correct “objects of perception”); it is just the right way to 
formalize those properties once they have been identified by 
a theoretically driven empirical programme of psychological research. The 
ecological approach is just such a programme (Golonka & Wilson, 2012) 
and it proposes that the most psychologically relevant set of physical proper-
ties in the ecologically scaled environment are affordances (Gibson, 1979; 
Scarantino, 2003; Turvey, 1992; Turvey et al., 1981).
Affordances are dispositional (Mumford, 2003) intensional properties of 
the world7; specifically, they are the subset of these properties that are 
action-relevant and perceptible. To say “My coffee mug affords grasping” 
is to identify that the relations between the surfaces that constitute the mug 
make it so that when certain satisfying conditions are met (say, the presence 
of an appropriately sized hand) the disposition to be grasped can be 
manifested. The affordance disposition is constituted by the cup’s surfaces 
and their physical properties (the anchoring properties of the disposition; 
Turvey et al., 1981) but the affordance itself is also a distinct higher-order 
property of the cup. The ecological hypothesis is that perceiving-acting 
organisms organize their behavior with respect to this latter property 
directly, and not via internal, inferential combination of the various anchor-
ing properties.
No physicist would ever identify affordance properties, but this is not 
because they are not real. Rather, it is because the physicist does not need to 
carve the world along these joints in order to explain the behavior of, say, 
a projectile flying through the air. Perceiving-acting organisms, in turn, do 
not need to carve the world up the way physicists do; instead, they must 
learn to pick out properties like affordances because those are the ones 
required to coordinate and control their behavior. But even though affor-
dances are not properties predicted by a theory of physics, they are still 
physically real properties and can be described as such, using the language of 
DST (see Wilson et al., 2016a, 2016b, 2018 for a detailed description of this 
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research programme in the context of long-distance throwing). Just as 
biology and chemistry do not reduce neatly to physics, neither does psy-
chology, and we must take this seriously. Our theories of perception must 
explain the perception of the organism’s world, and not the physicist’s.
Interestingly, this analysis provides an alternative way to read and inter-
pret the results of HS&P’s simulations. They repeatedly find that perceptual 
mappings that veridically preserve the structure of the world as described by 
physics are out-evolved because those properties cannot directly support 
adaptive, fit behavior. They are beaten by interfaces that directly represent 
the world in terms of behaviorally relevant properties. The ecological 
hypothesis is simply that these latter properties of the world exist prior to 
perception and do not need to be inferred. The straight-forward prediction 
would be that perceptual mappings that veridically preserve the structure of 
the world as described by ecological physics (e.g., affordances) should be able 
to directly support adaptive, fit behavior and survive the simulations. HS&P 
have not tested this exact hypothesis in their simulations, but the fact that 
naïve realist strategies that track fitness do survive suggests it should work 
out in our favor. If it did, this would imply that veridical mapping functions 
are only failing because HS&P have mischaracterized the physical world.
The Nature of Ecological Information
The second objection to the ecological approach is the Invention of 
Symmetry problem. My defensive move there was to point out that the 
symmetry underpinning specification falls outside the psychological scope 
of the problem. This section justifies that move by explaining how ecological 
information is formed and used.
The ecological world is a dynamical place. As environmental dynamics 
unfold over time, the various components of the dynamic (such as surfaces) 
interact with various energy media; light bounces of them, they generate 
sound waves in the atmosphere, and so on. The energy that reflects off 
a surface is lawfully changed by that interaction, from a field of unstruc-
tured, symmetrical, radiant energy into the structured, asymmetrical, ambi-
ent energy called an array; into ecological information for perception. The 
structure in the array is then available at a distance from the dynamical 
property that caused it, enabling perception of that property from 
a distance.
The structure of these arrays can be completely captured at the level of 
kinematics; time and motions, but not forces. The kinematic structure of 
that information is lawfully linked to the underlying dynamics by the 
ecological-scale laws that govern the projection of world into energy 
(Turvey et al., 1981), but that structure cannot be identical to the underlying 
dynamics because it is a projection into a medium that can only support 
14 A. D. WILSON
kinematic structure (the “perceptual bottleneck”; Bingham, 1988). 
Fortunately, information can still specify (map 1:1 to) those dynamical 
properties, and this specification can be used as direct access to behaviorally 
relevant properties by organisms because the mapping is between informa-
tion and those intensional properties, and not the extensional things that 
carry those properties. The basis of perception is therefore the kinematic 
specification of dynamics (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983).
Specification can be formalized as a symmetry principle (Shaw et al., 
1974; Turvey et al., 1981; see Chemero, 2009, Chapter 6 for the excellent, 
clear review from which I am borrowing here). The way the world is lawfully 
specifies that information is the way it is, which in turn lawfully specifies 
that perceptual experience is what it is; this then means that perceptual 
experience being what it is lawfully specifies what the information is, and 
what the information is lawfully specifies the way the world is. This sym-
metry is the underlying mechanism that allows perception to be direct and 
adaptive. But this symmetry is clearly outside the scope of the Invention of 
Symmetry theorem; it is not being psychologically inferred, it is a result of 
the operation of ecological scale physical laws. Critically, perceptual systems 
do not contain any knowledge of or assumptions about the underlying 
symmetry principle; organisms simply organize their behavior with respect 
to information variables and this works as access to behaviorally relevant 
properties (i.e. “is fit”) to the extent that the symmetry actually holds (see 
Golonka, 2015,; Golonka & Wilson, 2019a, b for more detail on this point).
Ecologically Solving Establishment Problems
The above analysis of the ecological world and the information it creates 
provides solutions to all the various problems posed by Establishment 
theories.
First, ecological information solves the grounding problem. According to 
Harnad (1990), the symbol grounding problem is eliminated if the relation-
ship between the world and the medium onto which it is projected is entirely 
lawful (meaning, non-arbitrary) because higher level systems inherit the 
lower level grounding. This is the same as making the relation between the 
world and information an internal one (Bickhard, 2009). Ecological infor-
mation is created via the operation of ecologically scaled laws (Turvey et al., 
1981) and thus is grounded (Golonka & Wilson, 2019a).
Second, ecological information solves the representation selection ques-
tion, in two ways. First, the ambiguity underlying this problem only occurs 
if perception is of extensions of properties; information is specific to the 
intensional properties themselves and so no ambiguity arises. Second, 
because information is created by the interaction of the current task 
dynamics with various energy media, only information about that dynamic 
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is available in the first place, so the organism does not need to choose how to 
interpret that information.
Third, the fact that information is specific to intensional properties, and 
not to propertied things (the extensions) leads to a powerful reframing of 
the issue of misperception. HS&P discuss several examples (pg. 1481) of 
animals adaptively using what seem to be non-veridical perceptual map-
pings. For example, dragonflies need to lay their eggs by water but do not 
seem to perceive “water” per se; instead, they pick up a pattern of polarized 
light caused in their niche by water and lay their eggs at the source of that 
light. Their perceptual experience is being structured by “polarized light,” 
which is not identical to “water” but supports an inference of the presence of 
“water”; their experience is non-veridical, but still adaptive. The problem is 
that “polarized light” does not specify “water”; shiny tombstones can pro-
duce the same effect, which can then lead dragonflies to make serious errors 
in where they lay their eggs. For HS&P, this error reveals both the non- 
veridical mapping at work and the presence of inference in the perceptual 
process.
The ecological solution comes in two parts. First, because information is 
about properties (intensions), not the bearers of those properties (exten-
sions), dragonflies are not non-veridically perceiving water, they are ver-
idically perceiving the presence of a surface with a particular property that 
polarizes light in a particular way. In the niche of the dragonfly, this 
polarized light means that the surface supports egg laying (because it is 
water) and the dragonfly learns this. This relation is a lawful one with 
a scope of the dragonfly’s niche; a small scope, but one well suited to the 
dragonfly. The presence of a shiny tomb breaks the scope of the law; 
however, it is an intrusion (in this case by human manufacturing) into the 
niche of the dragonfly, which breaks the lawfulness of the relation the 
dragonfly’s perception had depended on. This of course then leads to 
a maladaptive behavior; but Turvey et al. (1981) argue extensively that 
from the first person perspective of the dragonfly8 there is no mispercep-
tion and the behavior is not an error. The polarized light really is there and 
it has been correctly detected by the dragonfly. Within the niche of the 
dragonfly “polarized light” is lawfully caused by “water” and so the 
dragonfly would therefore only be in error if it did not try to lay eggs on 
that surface.
What we actually learn from misperception or illusion examples is that 
ecological laws have scope; they are not universal. This is true of all laws; 
even laws with enormous scope such as the law of gravity break down, for 
example, in a singularity. The scope of ecological laws are simply smaller 
and easier to cross. Perception relies on those laws in order to be adaptive, 
and so of course behavior becomes maladaptive if the scope is violated. 
Given time, however, and the presence of an information variable that 
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distinguishes between some property of water and tombs, the niche of the 
dragonfly will simply expand to accommodate the change.9
In summary, the ecological ontology is that organisms veridically, directly 
perceive behaviorally relevant dynamical properties (intensions) of the 
world by virtue of the ecological law-based symmetry between those proper-
ties and the information they create that allows the information to specify 
the property that created it. This detailed framework is the analysis that 
supports my defense of the ecological approach from the challenges posed 
by interface theory.
Conclusion
Interface theory makes many bold claims. Perceptual experience is an 
adaptive lie, it says, like the virtual desktop environment of a computer 
operating system. This is because in order to be evolutionarily fit, organisms 
must shape their behavior with respect to behaviorally relevant properties of 
the world, but the world as described by physics just isn’t carved up this way. 
Organisms must infer their way to the behaviorally relevant ones; they must 
invent a symmetry to a world that does not quite exist the way it looks in 
perceptual experience. In short, we do not perceive the world as it is.
The first thing to note is that this analysis is not actually as radical as it 
seems. It is, in fact, just a crystal clear expression of the inferential 
Establishment view of perception as inference on ambiguous sensory data. 
If behaviorally relevant properties of the world must be inferred because 
they cannot be specified in sensory data, of course the resulting mental 
representation shaping perceptual experience will not resemble the world 
that caused the sensory data in the first place. In this context, the “Invention 
of Symmetry” problem is revealed to actually be the representation/symbol 
grounding problem, and it is indeed as much of an issue for inference-based 
theories of perception as HS&P say. It has largely stopped being discussed, 
however, so while not new, interface theory has done the field a great service 
by formalizing the Establishment hypothesis in such impressive and ines-
capable detail such that grounding is forced back into the discussion. 
Interface theory embraces, rather than solves the grounding problem, how-
ever, which is what leads to all the worrying implications.
HS&P make one wrong move, however; they apply their analysis to the 
ecological approach to perception and action and conclude that such 
a perceptual system could never evolve. What they have failed to notice is 
that the ecological approach is not simply proposing a naïve realist interface 
mapping. It is actually the hypothesis that such interfaces are not required at 
all because perception can, in fact, be directly of behaviorally relevant 
properties of the world. This properly radical idea becomes possible when 
we stop trying to explain the perception of the observer-independent world 
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of physics, and instead work to explain the perception of the ecological 
umwelt of the organism (Baggs & Chemero, 2019). The ecological approach 
begins by correctly characterizing the new ontology of that ecological world 
(Gibson, 1979; Turvey et al., 1981) and then scientifically investigating the 
perception of those dynamical task properties (affordances) via the specify-
ing information those properties lawfully create.
The inferential and ecological approaches therefore diverge right at the 
ontological base, and, unlike Establishment theories, the ecological 
approach is safely shielded from any implications of interface theory. It 
therefore remains a viable (and promising) hypothesis about the nature of 
our perceptual contact with the world.
Notes
1. I’ve borrowed this phrase from Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981) because it’s a useful 
collective name for the various mainstream theories of perception, such as interface 
theory, that implement an inferential, representational approach.
2. A note for interested readers; Putnam (1980) produced a mathematical argument 
along the same lines as interface theory and ending in the same place. However, in 
typical Putnam style, he kept thinking about the issue, decided he had made an error 
and turned instead toward a realist stance, more along the lines of Gibson (Putnam, 
1994). I’m focused here on the specific ecological defense, but Putnam’s analyses may 
be another line of critical analysis of interface theory.
3. There may be reasons to disagree with the following labels; however, I will rely on 
HS&P’s terminology for the remainder of the paper to keep my rebuttal focused.
4. HS&P also raise two less novel objections. First, they claim that the ecological approach 
has no way to explain illusions. This is false (Turvey et al., 1981; De Wit et al., 2015) 
and there are examples of ecological accounts of apparent misperceptions (Runeson, 
1988; Zhu & Bingham, 2011; Zhu et al., 2013). Second, they claim that the evidence for 
information processing accounts of perception is now overwhelming. While there are 
many papers on this, there is also a strong empirical base for direct perception 
accounts, both in behavioral work and more recently in neuroscience work (e.g., 
Van Der Meer et al., 2012, Agyei et al, 2016a, 2016b). In addition, when direct 
perception and information processing accounts are directly pitted against one 
another, the former prevails (e.g., Fink, Foo & Warren, 2009; Markkula et al., 2014; 
Mon-Williams & Bingham, 2008; Zaal & Bootsma, 2011; Zhu & Bingham, 2010). These 
are common objections to the ecological approach, but they are rooted in misconcep-
tions of what Gibson was claiming and do not reflect the state of the research 
programme (Costall & Morris, 2015)
5. This is similar to Adams and Aizawa (2008) ‘mark of the cognitive’.
6. Bickhard (2009) also applies his analysis to the major modern players in the repre-
sentational literature, specifically Millikan, Dretske, Fodor, and Cummins and shows 
it holds for each of these; see also Ramsey (2007) for related critiques.
7. There remains some debate in the ecological literature about how best to formalize 
affordances (e.g., Chemero, 2003, 2009; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; Stoffregen, 2003) 
but the original dispositional analysis is the only one that explains how affordances 
create information and therefore be perceptible. For this reason the dispositional 
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account remains the most ontologically appropriate (see Wilson, 2021, for details on 
this argument).
8. See (Barrett, 2011) for a detailed discussion about the importance of this perspective 
to the analysis of perception
9. This part of the learning process is called the education of attention; see Jacobs & 
Michaels, 2007 for a detailed analysis
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